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WHAT IF DOMA WERE REPEALED? THE CONFUSED
AND CONFUSING INTERSTATE MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
JURISPRUDENCE
MARK STRASSER*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") 1 is constitutionally
vulnerable, and President Obama supports its repeal.2 Suppose, then,
that the Act was repealed or invalidated. Some of the effects DOMA's
repeal would have on marriage recognition practices are clear; for
example, same-sex couples who were validly married in their domicile
would presumably be entitled to federal benefits. However, other
possible effects are debatable. For example, whether DOMA's
absence would modify the conditions under which one state would
have the power to refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in
another state is a question with no clear answer.
There are at least two distinct reasons why the effects of DOMA's
repeal are much less clear than one might initially suppose. First, the
background law is itself controversial. For example, while the law of
the domicile at the time of a marriage's celebration has long been
understood to determine the validity of that marriage, there is much
less consensus about whether a subsequently acquired domicile can
refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated years before in a
sister domicile. Because the background law is not clear, it may be
difficult to determine in a particular set of circumstances whether
DOMA has changed or, instead, merely reaffirmed or reinforced

* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus Ohio.
1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
2. Joe Davidson, Rationale Builds for Same-Sex Benefits Law, WASH. POST,
Nov. 24, 2009, at 1 ("The Obama administration has found itself in the tricky
position of defending DOMA because it is the law, while calling for its repeal and
strongly supporting the congressional legislation.").
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existing law. Second, DOMA has never been authoritatively
construed, so it is difficult to identify all of the state practices
authorized by DOMA that, but for its passage, would not have been
permissible.
This Article addresses the likely effects of DOMA's repeal, noting
that many questions remain unanswered regarding the conditions
under which states have the power to refuse to give effect to marriages
validly celebrated in other states, especially when states can no longer
claim that the refusal to recognize a particular marriage is somehow
authorized by Congress. By the same token, a repeal of DOMA's
definition of marriage for federal purposes would leave open the
questions of when same-sex marriages would be recognized, and for
which federal purposes. While the repeal of DOMA would be most
welcome, it should not be assumed that this would end all difficulties
for same-sex couples and their families who seek the rights and
protections that families take for granted. On the contrary, even with
DOMA's repeal, these matters will continue to be litigated across the
United States for the foreseeable future.
II. THE FEDERAL DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

The Defense of Marriage Act has two provisions, one authorizing
states to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages celebrated
elsewhere ("the full faith and credit provision"),3 and the other
defining marriage for federal purposes.4 The former provision is
subject to differing interpretations,' while the latter is less ambiguous
if only because it is so all-encompassing on its face. 6 Each provision is
constitutionally vulnerable, in some respects for the same reason and
in other respects for differing reasons.
To understand the different respects in which these provisions are
constitutionally suspect, one must understand the state of the law as it
existed prior to DOMA and the ways that the Act may have changed
then-existing law. Once that is clear, it becomes easier to identify

3.
4.
5.
6.

28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
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some of the areas that will need further clarification once DOMA is no
longer the law of the land.
A. The Full Faith and Credit Provision
DOMA's full faith and credit provision reads:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territor , possession, or tribe, or a
right or claim arising from such relationship.

This provision was enacted when it was believed that Hawaii was
about to recognize same-sex marriage, and that domiciliaries8 of other
states would go to Hawaii, marry their same-sex partners, and then
return home demanding recognition of their marriages. 9 It might seem,
then, that DOMA's repeal would require states to recognize any
marriage validly celebrated in another state as a matter of full faith
and credit. But that claim is not plausible in light of past historical
practices-it has long been recognized that individuals living in one
state, who evade local marriage laws by going to another state to
marry, will not then be able to force their domiciles to recognize their

7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
8. "A person who resides in a particular place with the intention of making it a
principal place of abode; one who is domiciled in a particular jurisdiction." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 559 (9th ed. 2009).

9. See The Defense of MarriageAct: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 2 (1996), 1996 WL 387293 (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("Thus, it would not be surprising that persons who want to invoke the
legitimacy of 'marriage' for same-sex unions will travel to Hawaii to become
'married.' Then they will return to their home states where it would be expected that
the State recognize as valid a Hawaii marriage certificate."); The Defense of
MarriageAct: Hearingon S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 2 (1996), 1996 WL 387295 (testimony of Rep. Largent) ("If the state court in
Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriage, homosexual couples from other states around
the country will fly to Hawaii to 'many' [sic]. These same couples will then go back
to their respective states and argue that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution requires their home state to recognize their union as a 'marriage."').

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

3

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 11

252

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

marriages. 0 Rather, the validity of the marriage will be determined in
light of the domicile's law.' 1
Suppose, for example, that an eighteen-year-old wishes to marry
his sixteen-year-old girlfriend and local law prevents their marrying
until they each have reached age eighteen. They decide to go to
another state and marry in accord with local law, and then return to
their domicile. Such a marriage might be annulled in the domicile,
even if it was valid where celebrated.1 2 Yet, the fact that the domicile
could refuse to recognize a marriage that was prohibited locally but
validly celebrated elsewhere does not mean the domicile would refuse
to recognize such a marriage. A variety of important interests are
based on marital status, and the refusal to recognize a marriage might
jeopardize those benefits.' 3 For example, an individual might be
covered under an insurance policy by virtue of his marriage. Were that
marriage held void and of no legal effect, the individual might
suddenly find that he did not have the insurance coverage upon which
he had relied.14

10. See In re Stull's Estate, 39 A. 16, 17 (Pa. 1898) ("But where a man and
woman, citizens of the same state, and subject to an absolute statutory prohibition
against entering into a marriage contract which is against good morals and contrary
to public policy, leave their domicile, and enter another, for the express purpose of
violating the law of their domicile in this respect, the case is highly exceptional, and
the great weight of authority is against the validity of such a marriage in the place of
their domicile.").
11. Denise C. Morgan, Introduction:A Tale of (at Least) Two Federalisms,50
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 615, 633 (2005-2006) ("Historically, states have been free to
decline to recognize out-of-state marriages that are inconsistent with their own
policies.").
12. See Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. 1958) ("It is
undisputed that if the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant had taken
place here, the public policy of New Jersey would be applicable and the plaintiff
would be entitled to the annulment; and it seems clear to us that if New Jersey's
public policy is to remain at all meaningful it must be considered equally applicable
though their marriage took place in Indiana.").
13. See State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Ark.1957) ("The celebration of
a marriage gives rise to many ramifications, including questions of legitimacy,
inheritance, property rights, dower and homestead, and causes of action growing out
of the marital status. We have no statute which provides that marriages such as the
one involved here, celebrated in another state, are void in the State of Arkansas.").
14. Cf Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364 (Va. 1939)
(declaring marriage void, thus making putative spouse not entitled to workmen's
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Suppose two individuals evade their domicile's law by going
elsewhere to marry in accord with the law of the place of celebration.
Suppose further the validity of the marriage is later challenged. The
question for the court hearing the case will involve the degree to
which the marriage offends the domicile's public policy.' 5 A marriage
that, although prohibited, did not violate an important public policy of
the domicile might well be recognized if validly celebrated
elsewhere.16 As a general matter, states have an interest in preserving
and promoting marriage, and the specific state interest in prohibiting
the celebration of a particular kind of marriage might be outweighed
by the more general interest in sustaining marriages." This might be
especially true if, for example, children were born of the marriage. 8
Some states, however, do not consider whether a marriage was
validly celebrated elsewhere when deciding whether a marriage will
be recognized locally.' 9 Instead, they determine the validity of their

compensation benefits).
15. See In re Mortenson's Estate, 316 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Ariz. 1957)
("Marriages performed outside the state which offend a strong public policy of the
state of domicile will not be recognized as valid in the domiciliary state." (citing
Meisenhelder v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 213 N.W. 32 (Minn. 1927))).
16. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) ("Marriages not
polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the
law of the state where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other
jurisdiction." (citing Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877))).
17. Cf Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159
(1819) ("If the marriage takes place in a state whose laws allow it, the marriage is
certainly good there; and it would produce greater inconveniences than those
attempted to be guarded against, if a contract of this solemn nature valid in a
neighboring state, could be dissolved at the will of either of the parties, by stepping
over the line of a state, which might prohibit such marriages.").
18. See Garcia v. Garcia, 127 N.W. 586, 589 (S.D. 1910) ("The consequences
of declaring a marriage void ab initio and annulling the same are very serious. Its
effect is to bastardize innocent children, deprive them of their inheritance, and to
make the parties whose marriage was legal and valid in the state where contracted
criminally liable in this state, and subject to exceedingly severe penalties.").
19. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §765.04(1) (West 2009) ("If any person
residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or
prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state goes into another
state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared void under the
laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this state with the
same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.").
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domiciliaries' marriage in light of local marriage prohibitions, and a
marriage that could not be celebrated locally will not be recognized
even if it was valid where celebrated.2 0
The point here is not to spell out in detail the differing practices of
the states, but merely to suggest that all of these approaches are
considered within the power of the domicile at the time of the
marriage. A domicile could choose to recognize a marriage that was
valid where celebrated but prohibited locally, but does not have to do
so. Insofar as DOMA is understood as merely preserving the power of
the domicile to refuse to recognize a marriage of its domiciliaries
celebrated elsewhere, the Act seems better understood as affirming or
reinforcing existing law rather than changing it. 21 After all, DOMA
does not require states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
celebrated elsewhere; it merely permits states to do so.
Suppose someone claimed that a marriage validly celebrated in
one state had to be recognized in other states as a matter of full faith
and credit.2 2 While the Supreme Court has never so held,23 it is a
conceivable interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In any
event, members of Congress apparently feared the Court might
someday read the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require that
marriages validly celebrated in one state be recognized throughout the

20. See, e.g., In re Estate of Toutant, 633 N.W.2d 692, 700 (Wis. App. 2001)
("The trial court's decision is consistent with Wisconsin law. WIsCONsIN STAT. §
765.03 prohibited Ellis and Toutant's marriage, and thus, the Texas marriage is null
and void pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 765.04.").
21. See 142 CONG. REC. S4870 (daily ed. May 8, 1996), 1996 WL 468475
(statement of Sen. Nickles) (suggesting that DOMA reaffirms current practice and
policy).
22. See Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, A House Divided: An Argument
against the Defense of Marriage Act, OR. ST. B. BULL, Jan. 1998, at 17, 19
("[M]arriages should be granted at least the level of faith and credit accorded to
judgments.").
23. See Thomas ex rel. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998)
("Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and
common law) and to judgments."); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My
Mother?: Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L.
REv. 1, 4 (2008) ("[T~he Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a far more rigorous
obligation on states to recognize judgments, such as adoption decrees and divorces,
than marriages and laws.").
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country. 24 Indeed, some members of Congress implied that DOMA
was enacted as a defensive measure to forestall this interpretation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, notwithstanding that such an
interpretation had never been adopted, or even suggested, by the
Court. 25
Yet, the language of the DOMA full faith and credit provision
should not be understood as a narrow, purely defensive measure
designed to forestall an end-run around the domicile's power to
regulate the pre-requisites to marriage. Instead, that provision is
written in such a way as to invite constitutional review, even assuming
that there are no constitutional difficulties posed by having the
domicile at the time of a marriage's celebration determine that
marriage's validity. This provision authorizes so much that it
undermines, rather than protects, the power of a domicile to establish
the conditions under which its domiciliaries are permitted to get (and
remain) married. By providing that no state shall be required to
recognize a same-sex marriage validly performed under another
state's law, the provision not only authorizes a domicile to refuse to
recognize a marriage validly contracted in another state, but also
authorizes other states to refuse to recognize a marriage validly
celebrated in the domicile.
To understand the effects of this provision, it is helpful to consider
a variety of possible scenarios. Consider for example, two individuals
of the same sex, Alice and Barbara, who marry in accord with their
domicile's law. They have every intention of remaining in that state to
raise their children. However, a few years after their marriage, Alice
24. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 2913 (1996) ("But even as the Committee
believes that States currently possess the ability to avoid recognizing a same-sex
"marriage" license from another State, it recognizes that that conclusion is far from
certain. For example, there is a burgeoning body of legal scholarship-some of it
inspired directly by the Hawaiian lawsuit-to the effect that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does mandate extraterritorial recognition of 'marriage' licenses given
to homosexual couples."). Some members of Congress still seem to believe this. See,
e.g., Marriage Protection Amendment, 152 CONG. REc. S5945-03 (daily ed. June 15,
2006), 2006 WL 1650895 (statement of Sen. Grassley) [hereinafter Sen. Grassley]
("But, it has become a common prediction that the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
will be overturned by the judiciary. In that case, the full faith and credit clause of our
Constitution would require every State to recognize so-called marriages performed
in States that allow the union of same-sex couples .....
25. See Sen. Grassley, supra note 24.
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receives a very tempting job offer in a state that does not permit samesex couples to marry.
On its face, DOMA permits the later-acquired domicile to refuse
to recognize Alice and Barbara's marriage. A few different points
might be made about this aspect of DOMA. First, some of the
justifications for permitting a domicile at the time of the marriage to
refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated elsewhere do not
apply as readily where that domicile is acquired years after the
marriage has taken place. For example, because the law of the
domicile at the time of the marriage is traditionally the law that
determines the marriage's validity, some jurisdictions view those
attempting to evade local law by marrying elsewhere as imposing a
fraud on the jurisdiction. 26 But those who marry in accord with the
law of the domicile at the time of the marriage are not attempting to
perpetrate a fraud on the jurisdiction; on the contrary, they are
marrying in accord with local law. Further, it may well be that two
individuals of the same sex who marry in their domicile have no
intention of moving to a state that prohibits their marriage, so it is not
as if they are trying to impose a fraud on their future domicile when
they celebrate their marriage.
Individuals who marry in accord with their domicile's law have
the reasonable and justified expectation that they will remain married
until one of them dies or sues for divorce. Yet, DOMA authorizes the
non-recognition of a marriage by a new domicile, even when both
parties want the relationship to continue. With concerns expressed
about the possible detrimental effects on children posed by the
separation of their parents,27 one might expect that states would want
to encourage married couples to remain married rather than refuse
them that option, the individuals' desires to honor their marital
obligations notwithstanding. Needless to say, treating a marriage as if
26. See In re Stull's Estate, 39 A. 16, 18 (Pa. 1898) (noting that the evasive
marriage at issue "was contracted for the express purpose of evading the positive
law of the domicile, and is therefore ot [sic] be regarded as a fraud upon the
government and people of the domiciliary residence").
27. Cf., e.g., Mary E. O'Connell, Mandated Custody Evaluations and the
Limits of JudicialPower, 47 FAM. CT. REv. 304, 307 (2009) ("Judith Wallerstein's
studies, for example, suggested that, for at least some children, parental divorce has
serious, long-term negative effects, especially if the child loses contact with one
parent.").
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it had never existed might have severe repercussions both for the
adults in the relationship and for any children that the couple might be
raising.2 8
The scenario described above should be distinguished from one in
which a couple marries in the domicile, but then immediately moves
to a jurisdiction that prohibits the marriage. Indeed, to sharpen the
point, suppose the reason a couple marries in the current domicile,
rather than in the state where the individuals plan to live, is that they
know their future domicile does not permit them to marry. This is
analogous in several important respects to a case involving individuals
living in a domicile who seek to evade local law by marrying in a
different jurisdiction. In both cases, the individuals know they are
barred from marrying where they intend to live immediately after their
wedding, and they take steps to marry in a state where their union is
not prohibited by local law. Basically, they intend to circumvent the
law of the state where they intend to live.
Of course, a case in which two individuals seek to evade the
marriage laws of their soon-to-be domicile is not all on fours with a
case in which two individuals seek to evade the law of their current
domicile's law. In the former case, unlike the latter, the state in which
they plan to be live is not their legal domicile at the time of the
marriage-it will not become their legal domicile until after they
move there. 29 Nonetheless, this kind of case seems closer to the kind
of case where a couple seeks to evade local marriage laws than it does
to a case in which a couple marries in reliance on the law of the state
where they plan to make their home.
Traditionally, the domicile immediately after the marriage is not
required to recognize a marriage that could not be celebrated locally,
because that state would be viewed as having the most significant
connection to the marriage at the time of its celebration. 30 The new
28. For example, insurance benefits might be predicated on the state's
recognition of the adults' relationship.
29. See In re D.N., 522 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Iowa 1994) ("A new domicile is
obtained by the occurrence of three things: (1) A definite abandonment of the former
domicile; (2) Actual removal to, and physical presence in the new domicile; [and]
(3) A bona fide intention to change and to remain in the new domicile permanently
or indefinitely." (citing State ex rel. Palmer v. Hancock County 443 N.W.2d 690,
693 (Iowa 1989)) (alteration in original)).
30. See C.W. Taintor II, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and
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domicile could recognize the marriage, either out of a recognition of
the importance of promoting and maintaining marriage or for another
reason, just as the domicile at the time of the marriage can recognize
the validity of a marriage that is prohibited locally but permitted
according to the law of the place of celebration. 3 However, in neither
case would the domicile be viewed as acting beyond its power in
refusing to recognize such a marriage if one of its own important
public policies would be violated by recognizing the marriage.
The DOMA full faith and credit provision is not limited to cases
involving recognition of the marriage by the domicile at the time of
the marriage or even by a subsequently acquired domicile. Rather, this
provision authorizes any state to refuse to recognize a same-sex
marriage validly celebrated under another state's law. This means that
a state through which a same-sex, married couple is traveling would
be permitted to refuse to recognize the validity of the marriage should
the validity of that marriage be important to establish.
Suppose that Alice and Barbara marry in their domicile according
to local law and then, a few years later, decide to accept a wonderful
employment opportunity in another state that also recognizes their
marriage. However, to drive to their new domicile, they must travel
through states that do not recognize their marriage. Suppose further
that they are involved in an auto accident in transit and that Alice is
injured. Barbara's ability to visit Alice in the hospital or, perhaps, to
make decisions about Alice's medical care might depend upon
whether their marital relationship is recognized.3 2 Further, the right to

Status of Marriage, 19 B.U. L. REv. 353, 367 (1939) ("The intrinsic validity of this
status may be referred to the law of the place of ceremony, to the law of the domicil
of both parties if they live in the same state, to the law of the domicils of either or
both of the parties if they live in different states, or to the law of the state in which
the parties intend to live as husband and wife." (footnotes omitted)).
31. Cf supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
32. See Patience Crozier, Nuts and Bolts: Estate Planning and Family Law
Considerationsfor Same-Sex Families, 30 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 751, 754 (2008)
("Marriage provides significant protections in terms of hospital visitation, organ
donation, and control over bodily remains. A spouse is considered next-of-kin and
has the right of visitation in a Massachusetts hospital as well as the authority to
consent to medical treatment if the other is incapacitated.").
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sue for loss of consortium or, perhaps, wrongful death might also
depend upon whether their relationship was recognized. 33
Some commentators suggest that DOMA's full faith and credit
provision, as applied to facts similar to those involving Alice and
Barbara above, is unconstitutional as a violation of the right to
travel.3 4 Yet, it should be noted that the right to travel does not merely
include the right to visit or travel through a state, but also the right to
emigrate to a state.35 Further, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress does not have the power to authorize states to abridge the
right to travel. 36 If, indeed, the right to travel precludes a state from
refusing to recognize a marriage of individuals traveling through the
state when that marriage is valid in the domicile, the right to travel
may also require newly acquired domiciles to recognize a marriage
that was validly celebrated in the domicile at the time of the
marriage.37 That would depend upon whether the interests of the new
domicile in refusing to recognize such a marriage were sufficiently
weighty to justify imposing such a burden on the right to travel.
It might be argued that states will have no difficulty in meeting
such a burden if, indeed, it is constitutionally permissible for those
states to prohibit same-sex marriage. 38 But that is incorrect, and
especially so when one considers that many of the cases upholding
33. Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity Politics in Tort Litigation, 88
N.C. L. REv. 357, 390 (2010) ("[M]any tort claims, including wrongful death,
alienation of affection, loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, rely upon the existence of a marital relationship for the plaintiff to establish
a claim.").
34. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 50 (2006) ("In every state in the United

States, visiting same-sex couples are entitled to the protection of the law.").
35. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
36. Id. at 507-08 ("Congress may not authorize the States to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the protection afforded to the citizen by the
Citizenship Clause of that Amendment is a limitation on the powers of the National
Government as well as the States." (footnote omitted)).
37. See generally Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On
Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 553 (2000).
38. See John Choon Yoo & Anntim Vulchev, A Conservative Critique of the
Federal Marriage Amendment, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 728 (2004-2005)

(suggesting that if a state can prohibit same-sex marriage than it cannot be required
to recognize such marriages by virtue of right to travel guarantees).
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same-sex marriage bans have examined the relevant statutes in light of
the rational basis test. 39 If indeed the refusal to recognize a marriage
validly celebrated in a sister domicile implicates the right to travel,
then a higher level of scrutiny will be required. 40 Given that same-sex
marriage bans may not even survive rational basis scrutiny,41 it might
be quite difficult for such a statute to survive an even higher level of
scrutiny.
Suppose the right to travel requires that a marriage valid in the
domiciliary state must also be recognized in all of the other states.
Suppose further that the right to travel includes not only the right to
visit other states but also the right to emigrate to other states. In that
event, the full faith and credit provision of DOMA would be
unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized states to abridge those
rights. By the same token, states would be precluded from refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages that were valid in the domiciliary state
at the time of the marriage. Needless to say, however, this is one area
that will need to be addressed even after DOMA is no longer the law
of the land-namely, the conditions under which states have the
power to refuse to recognize marriages valid in the domicile at the
time of the marriage.
The DOMA full faith and credit provision not only permits states
to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other states, but
also permits states to refuse to give effect to any "right or claim

39. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006) ("Our
conclusion that there is a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
leads us to hold that that limitation is valid under the New York Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses, and that any expansion of the traditional definition of
marriage should come from the Legislature.")
40. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 148 (2008) ("[A] court must analyze a law that
infringes on the fundamental right to travel among the states under strict
scrutiny....").
41. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)
("[T]he marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or
equal protection."); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)
("Although the classification challenged here should be analyzed using heightened
scrutiny, it does not satisfy even rational-basis review, which requires that the
classification 'rationally further a legitimate state interest."' (citing Affronti v.
Crosson, 746 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (2001))).
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arising from such relationship."4 2 Presumably, this includes a whole
host of rights associated with marriage.
In Baker v. State,4 3 the Vermont Supreme Court noted many of
the benefits tied to marriage. 44 Some of the rights or benefits discussed
by the Vermont Supreme Court arise by virtue of the relationship
itself; for example, the right to bring an action for wrongful death or
loss of consortium. However, other rights require further proceedings.
For example, one is not entitled to receive spousal support simply by
virtue of having been married-one will also need to have a court
award that support.
One matter left open to interpretation is whether DOMA
distinguishes among the rights or claims arising from same-sex
marriage that other states have been authorized to ignore. According
to one possible interpretation of the language, those rights or claims
arising from the relationship would be limited to those that had not
been reduced to judgment. 4 5
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
43. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
44. See id. at 883-84 ("They include, for example, the right to receive a
portion of the estate of a spouse who dies intestate and protection against
disinheritance through elective share provisions ... ; preference in being appointed
as the personal representative of a spouse who dies intestate . . .; the right to bring a
lawsuit for the wrongful death of a spouse . . . ; the right to bring an action for loss
of consortium . . . ; the right to workers' compensation survivor benefits . . . ; the

right to spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public employees, including
health, life, disability, and accident insurance ... ; the opportunity to be covered as a
spouse under group life insurance policies issued to an employee . . . ; the

opportunity to be covered as the insured's spouse under an individual health
insurance policy . . . ; the right to claim an evidentiary privilege for marital

communications ... ; homestead rights and protections . . ; the presumption of joint
ownership of property and the concomitant right of survivorship . . . ; hospital

visitation and other rights incident to the medical treatment of a family member . . ;
and the right to receive, and the obligation to provide, spousal support, maintenance,
and property division in the event of separation or divorce....").
45. Ralph Whitten suggests that DOMA may be read to exclude only
declaratory judgments from full faith and credit guarantees. See Ralph U. Whitten,
Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships:Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions
and Concerns, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1235, 1249 (2001) ("[T]he better construction

of DOMA would limit its inclusion of judgments to the kind of evil at which
Congress was aiming: a bogus declaratory judgment action in the state where the
same-sex partners are wedded that is designed to force other states to accept the
same-sex marriage contrary to their laws.").

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 11

262

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

To see the point, it may be helpful to consider how full faith and
credit traditionally works in a context having nothing to do with samesex marriage. Suppose that a particular state's law holds certain
gambling debts unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 46 Suppose
further that an individual who is domiciled in that state has out-ofstate gambling debts outstanding, and the creditor sues him to collect
those debts. Finally, assume the debts are enforceable where they were
incurred. The creditor might seek to have the debt reduced to
judgment in the state where they were incurred and then seek to have
that judgment enforced in the debtor's domicile. Or, the individual
owed the monies might bring evidence of the debt (e.g., a note signed
by the debtor promising to pay a certain amount) to the debtor's
domicile and seek to have the courts there render a judgment requiring
the debtor to pay.
It would not be a matter of indifference as to which strategy was
adopted by the individual owed the debt. Suppose, for example, that
he sought to enforce the debt in the debtor's domicile by having a
court there issue a judgment requiring the debt to be paid. A court in
that jurisdiction might hold that because gambling debts are void and
unenforceable, the debtor could not be ordered to pay.47 If, instead, the
debt had been reduced to judgment in the state where it was incurred
and then the debtor sought to have that judgment enforced in the
debtor's domicile, the court in the debtor's domicile would enforce the
judgment as a matter of full faith and credit, 48 even though it would
46. See In re Hionas, 361 B.R. 269, 273 (Bankr. S. D. Fla. 2006) ("Gambling,
with certain exceptions, is against Florida's public policy. Fla. Stat. § 849.26 (2005)
unequivocally provides that any type of gambling debt that is not expressly
authorized by law is 'void and of no effect.' Florida courts have repeatedly
interpreted this provision to mean that only gambling debts authorized by Florida
law are enforceable, and that gambling debts, even when incurred in a jurisdiction
where the debt is legal and enforceable, cannot be enforced by a Florida court."
(citing Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Herman, 629 So.2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993))).
47. Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Herman, 629 So.2d 882, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) ("Foreign casino gambling obligations, although valid where created,
are unenforceable in Florida.").
48. See In re Hionas, 361 B.R. at 273 n.3 ("[I]f a gambling debt has been
reduced to judgment, Florida courts will enforce the foreign judgment under the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution." (citing M & R Inv. Co.,
Inc. v. Hacker, 511 So.2d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987))).
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not have enforced the debt had there been no judgment from another
state.
The point here should not be misunderstood. The issue is not
whether Congress has the power to modify full faith and credit
guarantees. Rather, it is that the phrase "right or claim arising from
such relationship" is itself ambiguous-it might only refer to a right or
claim predicated on the existence of a same-sex marriage that has not
been reduced to judgment, or it might also include a judgment
predicated on the existence of a same-sex marriage. Similarly, a state
statute that holds gambling debts unenforceable as contrary to public
policy might mean merely that gambling debts not reduced to
judgment are unenforceable, or might be construed to include all
gambling debts, including those reduced to judgment. Whether the
state could refuse to enforce a gambling debt that had been reduced to
judgment without offending constitutional guarantees is a different
question; 49 at issue here is how to interpret the language of the
provision.
Certainly, one possible interpretation is that the DOMA full faith
and credit provision was intended to authorize states to refuse to
enforce judgments involving same-sex relationships recognized in
other states.50 Indeed, it is inaccurate to suggest that DOMA's
"language is too plain (and with respect to judgments, too clearly
supported by the legislative history) to be construed away." 5 1 The
language is compatible with a construction that includes judgments,
but is also amenable to interpretation as only applying to those rights
and claims arising by virtue of the relationship itself-the language
itself says "arising from the relationship." The legislative history is
not dispositive, because the fear was that Hawaiian marriages would

49. A separate issue of course is whether a state could refuse to enforce such a
judgment without violating federal constitutional guarantees. See Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230 (1908) (gambling debt reduced to judgment in Missouri enforceable in
Mississippi, even though the judgment could not have been obtained in Mississippi
courts).
50. Kathryn J. Harvey, The Rights of Divorced Lesbians: Interstate
Recognition of Child Custody Judgments in the Context of Same-Sex Divorce, 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 1379, 1419-20 (2009) ("[D]ivorce and custody orders are within
the scope of DOMA if they arise from the rights of a same-sex couple that is legally
married and divorced.").
51. See Koppelman, supra note 34, at 128.
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have to be given full faith and credit, not that Hawaiian divorces
would have to be given full faith and credit. It may well be that the
only judgments that DOMA was designed to reach were themselves
"bogus;" 52 therefore, DOMA should not be construed as reaching
divorce decrees.
There are at least two reasons why the correct interpretation of
this provision is important to resolve. First, it may affect DOMA's
constitutionality. The Supreme Court has explained that its "precedent
differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and
common law) and to judgments." 5 3 A state is not required to adopt
another state's laws instead of its own. 54 However, the judgments of
other states are given more respect. As the Court explained in Baker v.
General Motors Corp.,55 "Regarding judgments, . . . the full faith and
credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered
by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and
persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition
throughout the land." 56
The fact that full faith and credit guarantees are more robust when
judgments are at issue does not establish DOMA's unconstitutionality.
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
special powers with respect to full faith and credit-"Congress may
by General laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect thereof."57 That said,
however, there is some question whether Congress has the power to
reduce the full faith and credit to be given to judgments,58 and even if

52. See Whitten, supra note 45, at 1249 (suggesting that Congress was only
trying to reach judgments that were "bogus" anyway).
53. Thomas ex. rel. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998).
54. Id. at 232-33 ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject
matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."' (citing Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co.
v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))).
55. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
56. Id. at 233.
57. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
58. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors
that Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REv. 915, 934 (2006)
(discussing the "oft-repeated critique is that DOMA is unconstitutional because it
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so, whether DOMA is sufficiently general to meet the express
constitutional requirements set out in Article IV. 59
Yet, the point here is not to discuss DOMA's unconstitutionality
but, instead, to consider the effects of its repeal. Suppose, then, that
Congress constitutionally has the power to pass the DOMA full faith
and credit provision, but repeals it. Whether or not DOMA allows the
states to ignore judgments validly issued in other states, these states
clearly cannot refuse to recognize such judgments in the absence of
congressional authorization. For example, a divorce decree including a
property distribution award or, perhaps, spousal support would be
subject to the same treatment that such judgments and awards now
receive when different-sex couples dissolve their unions.
Were such decrees subject to full faith and credit guarantees,
some of the perverse incentives inherent in the current system would
cease to exist. Consider two partners, Carl and David, who marry and
divorce in Massachusetts. Suppose the divorce decree divides certain
marital property between them and orders Carl to pay David periodic
spousal support. Rather than do what he has been ordered to do, Carl
moves to Georgia, a state with its own version of DOMA that
precludes the state from enforcing any rights or claims predicated on
the existence of a same-sex marriage. 60 If indeed the federal Defense
of Marriage Act is interpreted to permit states to refuse to enforce
judgments predicated on the existence of a same-sex marriage, then
David would be unable to go to Georgia to enforce those rights that
have been reduced to judgment in Massachusetts. It is hardly good
public policy to give individuals an incentive to cross state lines so
that they can ignore their court-imposed obligations. If DOMA is
flatly subverts the Full Faith and Credit Clause's foundational principle").
59. See Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense
of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 279, 297-301 (1997)
(suggesting that DOMA does not meet the generality requirement).
60. See GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, pt. I(b) ("No union between persons of the
same sex shall be recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage.
This state shall not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other state or jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of the same
sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other state or jurisdiction.
The courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate
maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise to consider or rule on
any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such
relationship.").
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repealed, David would no longer be able to escape validly-imposed
obligations simply by crossing state lines.
A separate question involves the constitutionality of the various
state laws prohibiting the recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages. Certainly, DOMA's repeal would render certain parts of
existing state statutes and constitutional provisions unenforceable,
specifically those provisions that preclude the enforcement of a
judgment validly issued in another state merely because that judgment
was predicated on the existence of a same-sex marriage. Yet, a
separate question is whether the unconstitutionality of such a
provision would require invalidation of the statute or amendment
containing it-that is, whether the provision would be severable. 61
Consider a statute or state constitutional amendment that
precludes recognition of same-sex marriages validly celebrated
elsewhere and, in addition, precludes enforcement of judicial decrees
predicated on the existence of a same-sex marriage. If the latter
provision were severable, it would become unenforceable while the
former provision continued in full force. The state would have to
enforce a Massachusetts divorce judgment involving a same-sex
couple, but would not have to recognize the marriage if instead the
parties sought a divorce in that jurisdiction.
Consider a variation on the example involving Carl and David.
They marry in Massachusetts but do not divorce there. Rather, while
still married to David, Carl moves to Georgia to accept an
employment opportunity. David remains in Massachusetts to sell their
home before joining Carl in Georgia. Suppose the housing market is
rather slow and that David remains in Massachusetts for a year before
selling their home. David then moves to Georgia. Regrettably, perhaps
in part because of the year of separation, the marriage breaks down
and David seeks a divorce in a Georgia court. Even if DOMA were
repealed, and Georgia courts were precluded from refusing to
recognize a divorce decree involving a same-sex couple, that alone
would not preclude Georgia courts from refusing to recognize a
marriage validly celebrated in another jurisdiction. Unless states are
required to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in another

61. Cf Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation,
98 GEO. L.J. 341, 387 (2010) ("Many states, such as Massachusetts, essentially
require that severability clauses be read into every statute .... ).
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domicile (e.g., because of the right to travel),6 2 Georgia courts might
be constitutionally permitted to refuse to recognize the marriage (and
thus refuse to dissolve the union),6 3 even if they were not permitted to
refuse to recognize and enforce a divorce decree validly issued
elsewhere.
If the Federal Defense of Marriage Act were repealed, there
would be a host of questions that would require answers. It is simply
unclear under what conditions, if any, the United States Constitution
permits a state to refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in a
sister domicile. Because it is assumed by many that Congress has the
power to pass DOMA,6 4 it has not been thought necessary to address
the limitations on state power that would exist but for the existence of
DOMA. If and when DOMA is repealed, it will be necessary to
determine whether there are any limitations on the states with respect
to their power to refuse to recognize marriages validly celebrated in
other states.
B. Defining Marriagefor FederalPurposes
The other DOMA provision defines marriage for federal purposes.
It reads:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife. 65

62. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
63. Cf Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002) (refusing to
recognize a Vermont civil union under Connecticut law).
64. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
Judgments under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365,
395 (2005) ("[T]here can be no question that in enacting DOMA Congress was
acting within the scope of its authority under the Constitution to prescribe the effects
that must be given to sister-states judgments."); Daniel A. Crane, The Original
Understandingof the "Effects Clause" of Article IV, Section 1 and Implicationsfor
the Defense of MarriageAct, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 307, 336 (1998) (suggesting
that Congress has plenary power to pass DOMA).
65. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1996).
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This provision seems less ambiguous if only because it is so allinclusive-basically, it suggests that a same-sex marriage will not be
recognized for any federal purpose. While this might seem to be well
within Congress's power because, after all, this provision permits
states to define marriage as they wish for their own purposes, this is an
unprecedented step that likely violates constitutional guarantees.
It is important to understand that there is no federal domestic
relations law. The United States Supreme Court recognized long ago
that the "whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws
of the United States." 66 While the federal government can supplant
state family law in certain circumstances, the government must
establish that important federal interests will be significantly harmed
unless state law is displaced.6 7
When Congress defines who is married to whom, notwithstanding
contrary state law, it supplants that contrary state law. It is entirely
unclear which federal interests, if any, would suffer harm if same-sex
marriages were afforded federal recognition. For example, it cannot
plausibly be argued that the relevant test is met whenever the federal
government might thereby save money, both because the Court has
already held the contrary 68 and because that would impose, at most, a
minimal burden on the federal government whenever it needed to
justify its displacing state law. Further, it is equally implausible that
the federal government has an important interest in preventing the
recognition of same-sex marriages for two distinct reasons. First, it is
difficult to imagine what that interest would be. Recognizing same-sex
marriage would not somehow harm different-sex marriage 69 -it
simply is not plausible to claim that recognizing same-sex marriage
66. Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
67. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) ("Before a state law governing
domestic relations will be overridden, it 'must do major damage to clear and
substantial federal interests."' (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
581 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 348 (1966) (suggesting that the
federal interest in collecting money that it lends is not a sufficiently important
interest to justify displacing state domestic relations law).
69. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965 ("Recognizing the right of an individual to
marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of oppositesex marriage .... ).
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would either cause different-sex couples not to marry or would cause
different-sex couples to divorce sooner than they otherwise would
have. 70 Second, this provision does not prevent the recognition of
same-sex marriages in the states, but merely withholds such
recognition for federal purposes. If, indeed, the recognition of samesex marriage will bring about calamitous effects, then this DOMA
provision does nothing to avert that calamity. As a separate matter, it
might be noted that the various states in which such unions are
recognized have not undergone the terrible consequences that samesex marriage opponents envision.7 1
Suppose, then, that DOMA is repealed. Without this provision,
the presumption that domestic relations are established by state rather
than federal law would control. For example, same-sex couples who
are married in Massachusetts would be entitled to federal benefits, just
as different-sex couples who marry in Massachusetts are entitled to
federal benefits. Be that as it may, there are a number of unanswered
questions with respect to the possible effects of a repeal of the
provision defining marriage for federal purposes.
Consider, for example, the effect of this repeal on immigration. It
would no longer be possible for a court to say that a same-sex partner
of a United States citizen cannot be considered a marital partner by
virtue of DOMA. Nonetheless, a separate question would involve the
meaning to be given to the fact of the repeal.
Suppose that the repeal were interpreted to be the equivalent of
Congress never having enacted DOMA in the first place. It might be
assumed, then, that the relevant answer could be found by considering
whether same-sex marriages were recognized for federal immigration

70. Mark Strasser, State Constitutional Amendments Defining Marriage: On
Protections,Restrictions, and Credibility, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 365, 368 (2005)
("Just as it is unlikely that fewer different-sex couples would marry merely because
same-sex couples were also offered that option, it is also improbable that the divorce
rate of different-sex couples would increase if same-sex marriages were recognized.
It is unreasonable to assume that different-sex couples would refuse to remain
married if same-sex couples were also afforded the opportunity to marry." (footnotes
omitted)).
71. Cf Harold P. Southerland, "Love for Sale"--Sex and the Second American
Revolution, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 49, 111 (2008) (noting that "no ill
effects have yet been experienced in Massachusetts").
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purposes before DOMA's passage. In fact, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed precisely this issue in Adams v. Howerton.72
Adams involved the marriage between Richard Adams, a United
States citizen, and Anthony Sullivan, who was not a United States
citizen. 73 They obtained a marriage license from the county clerk in
Boulder, Colorado, and were married by a minister there.7 4 Adams
then petitioned the INS "[to classify] Sullivan as an immediate relative
of an American citizen, based upon Sullivan's alleged status as
Adam's spouse." 75
The Ninth Circuit explained that "a two-step analysis is necessary
to determine whether a marriage will be recognized for immigration
purposes. The first is whether the marriage is valid under state law.
The second is whether that state-approved marriage qualifies under
the Act." 76 The court did not believe that Colorado would recognize
the marriage, citing an unpublished opinion by the Colorado Attorney
General that same-sex marriages would have no legal effect in the
state.77 The court also noted that while "Colorado statutory law ...
neither expressly permits nor prohibits homosexual marriages, some
statutes appear to contemplate marriage only as a relationship between
a male and a female." 78 Thus, the court did not believe that the
marriage satisfied the first prong of the analysis.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals did not rest its decision solely on
its belief that the state would not recognize the marriage-it focused
instead on the second prong of the test. 79 The court noted that
Congress has plenary power over immigration,80 and then interpreted
72. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
73. See id. at 1038.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1039 ("The Colorado Attorney General in an informal, unpublished
opinion addressed to a member of the Colorado legislature three days after the
alleged marriage in question occurred, stated that purported marriages between
persons of the same sex are of no legal effect in Colorado.").
78. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (1973)).
79. Id. ("Even if the Adams-Sullivan marriage were valid under Colorado law,
the marriage might still be insufficient to confer spouse status for purposes of
federal immigration law.").
80. See id. at 1041 ("The Court without exception has sustained Congress'
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congressional intent to preclude the recognition of same-sex marriage
for immigration purposes.
Some of the force of the Adams analysis regarding congressional
intent has been vitiated in the meantime. For example, the court
seemed to believe that same-sex couples would not be raising
children8 1 and that this might affect Congress's willingness to
recognize a same-sex marriage for immigration purposes. Yet, it is
true that same-sex couples are having and raising children. 82 if
Congress believes that bi-national families must be recognized for the
sake of the children that might be raised in such families, then this
would be a reason to recognize, rather than to refuse to recognize,
same-sex marriages.

The Adams court referred to the commonly accepted definitions of
"marriage" and "spouse" at the time, suggesting that Congress would
not even be considering marriages between same-sex partners. 8 The
court further noted that Congress had manifested elsewhere its intent
to exclude on the basis of sexual orientation. 84 Yet, the common
understanding of marriage changed since the Adams decision. At the
time that Adams was decided, no countries recognized same-sex

'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who
possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden."' (citing Boutilier v.
Immig. & Natural. Servs., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967))).
81. See id. at 1043 ("Perhaps this is because homosexual marriages never
produce offspring. . . .").
82. See Caleb W. Langston, Fundamental Right, Fundamentally Wronged:
Oregon's UnconstitutionalStand on Same-Sex Marriage, 84 OR. L. REV. 861, 899900 (2005) ("Yet even if having and raising children were an indispensable
component of marriage, same-sex couples could not be prohibited from marrying on
that basis. While it is true that only opposite-sex couples can procreate through
sexual intercourse, same-sex couples can and do choose to have children through
adoption or assisted reproduction.").
83. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 ("The term 'marriage' ordinarily contemplates a
relationship between a man and a woman. The term 'spouse' commonly refers to
one of the parties in a marital relationship so defined. Congress has not indicated an
intent to enlarge the ordinary meaning of those words." (citations omitted)).
84. See id. ("Yet, both section 15(b) of the amendments, Pub.L. No. 89-236, s
15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (codified at 8 U.S.C. s 1182(a)(4)), and the accompanying
Senate Report, S.Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, (1965) U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad.News 3328, 3343, clearly express an intent to exclude homosexuals."
(citing Boutilier v. Immig. & Natural. Servs., 387 U.S. 118, 121 (1967))).
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marriages.8 5 Because same-sex marriage is currently recognized in
some states and in some nations,86 it is no longer an oxymoron to refer
to a same-sex union as a marriage. Further, far from excluding on the
basis of sexual orientation, the United States offers asylum to those
who might face persecution in their home countries based on that
trait.8 7 Finally, the current discussion assumes that the DOMA
provision defining marriage for federal purposes will be repealed. But
before such a repeal occurs, Congress would likely consider and reject
the wisdom of refusing to recognize same-sex marriages for federal
purposes.
If DOMA were simply repealed and no guidance was offered as to
the conditions under which the federal government would recognize
same-sex marriages for federal purposes, different courts might be
expected to reach different conclusions about the consequences of that
repeal. For example, a split of authority on the issue of whether a binational same-sex couple would be recognized as married for federal
immigration purposes would not be surprising, even if the state where
the individuals were domiciled permitted same-sex couples to marry.
Ultimately, this will be a question for the courts to decide.
Congress has good reason not merely to repeal the federal
definition section of DOMA, but also to affirmatively express a desire

85. See Anthony R. Reeves, Sexual Identity as a Fundamental Human Right,
15 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 263 (2009) ("In 2001, the Netherlands became the
first country in the world to recognize same-sex marriage.").
86. See Kim Willoughby, Lewis v. Lewis and Non-Married Partner
Litigation, 39 COLO. LAW. 33, 36 n.54 (Jan. 2010) ("Countries that recognize samesex marriage are: Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain,
and Sweden." (citing International Progress Toward the Freedom to Marry,
FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/intemational-progress-

toward-the-freedom-to-marry (last updated Jan. 2011))).
87. See Ellen A. Jenkins, Taking the Square Peg Out of the Round Hole:
Addressing the Misclassificationof TransgenderAsylum Seekers, 40 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 67, 67-68 (2009) ("It was a watershed victory for the gay and lesbian
community when United States courts first recognized that sexual orientation was a
legal ground for membership in a particular social group for asylum-seeking
purposes. This gave an unprecedented number of gay and lesbian asylum seekers the
ability to escape persecution in their countries of origin and begin new lives in the
United States.").
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to recognize validly celebrated same-sex marriages.8 8 Suppose the
focus is shifted from bi-national couples involving at least one United
State citizen to a marriage involving two same-sex foreign nationals
who married in accord with the law of their country. Suppose further
that during a visit to the United States the validity of their marriage
needs to be established. It would be in the United States' foreign
policy interest to avoid the international embarrassment that would
flow from a refusal to recognize such a marriage. As a separate matter,
the United States' refusal to recognize these marriages harms its
economic interests by deterring tourism from those who fear their
unions will not be recognized.
An example is useful to illustrate another point. In 2009, Iceland
became the first country to have an openly lesbian Prime Minister. 89
Were Congress to refrain from doing more than merely repealing
DOMA's definition of marriage for federal purposes, a different kind
of international embarrassment could occur. Suppose that a lesbian or
gay head of state were to come with his or her same-sex spouse to the
United States, perhaps to address the United Nations. A refusal by the
federal government, or a state government, to recognize that
dignitary's marriage would not only be utterly embarrassing, 90 but
88. Cf Cynthia Juarez Lange, Selected Documents, at 41, 53, PLI Order No.
18655, 1768 PLI/Corp 41 (PLI Corp. & Prac. Course Handbk. Ser. No. 1768, 2009)
("Earlier this week, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the Uniting
American Families Act (S. 424), sponsored by Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy
(D-VT). The bill would extend spousal immigration benefits to qualifying
permanent partners-including same-sex partners-of U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents.").
89. See 2009 - Year of Heroes, SUNDAY MAIL (Austl.), Dec. 20, 2009, at 80

("Jhanna Sigurdardttir is appointed as the new Prime Minister of Iceland, becoming
the world's first openly lesbian head of government.").
90. Cf Godfrey v. DiNapoli, 866 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (2008) ("The
comptroller's decision to recognize same-sex Canadian marriages is based on the
determination that such marriages are legal in that jurisdiction and would not
otherwise be inconsistent with New York law. New York, unlike the majority of
States, has not enacted a 'defense-of-marriage' act so as to expressly prohibit
recognition of same-sex marriages. Moreover, the question posed to the
Comptroller, and the policy determination that resulted, do not concern marriages
involving polygamy or incest. Consequently, the determination by the Comptroller
to recognize same-sex marriages performed in Canada, in accordance with the laws
of that jurisdiction, is consistent with New York law regarding the recognition of
marriages performed elsewhere.").

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

25

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 11

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41

274

could also damage international relations. That a head of state would
be less cooperative with countries that refused to recognize his or her
family would not be surprising. By the same token, similar difficulties
might arise if the spouses of important advisors were not recognized.
Thus, according federal recognition to marriages validly celebrated in
the parties' domicile might be not only the right thing to do, but the
prudent thing to do.
III. CONCLUSION
The Federal Defense of Marriage Act authorizes any state to
refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in another state.
Further, it defines marriage for federal purposes in such a way that
same-sex married couples cannot qualify for federal benefits. Its
repeal would be most welcome. Nonetheless, DOMA's repeal would
not guarantee same-sex couples and their families the kinds of
protections that other families take for granted. On the contrary,
repealing DOMA would merely be a first step. Courts would still have
to work out the conditions under which an out-of-state marriage, valid
at the time of celebration, could nonetheless be denied full faith and
credit. Further, courts would need to identify the conditions under
which federal recognition would be accorded to marriages that were
valid in the domicile at the time of celebration.
Marriage provides a variety of benefits to the adults in the
relationship, and to any children of the marriage. It is both surprising
and disappointing that some states, and the federal government, refuse
to recognize same-sex marriages, especially considering the
foreseeable and detrimental effects on same-sex partners and their
families. With no offsetting benefits to justify DOMA, Congress
would be wise to repeal it as soon as possible. However, DOMA's
repeal will be but one step along the road toward securing for LGBT 9 1
families the rights and protections that all families need and deserve.
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